Although the indexing provisions of ERTA were in effect for only two years before being superseded by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), TRA86 extended the indexing scheme specified by ERTA, with only minor modifications. First, TRA86 eliminated the zero-bracket amount of taxable income, that is, the taxable income level below which the marginal tax rate is zero. By way of compensation, personal exemption levels, the standard deduction level, and the earned-income tax credit for low-income An "index year1! is referred to in ERTA as a "calendar year." As our subsequent discussion makes clear, this terminology is somewhat misleading in that its reference to a calendar year does not correspond to a 12-month period that spans January to December. Tax years, on the other hand, do correspond to the usual Januaryto-December calendar year. A simple example will suffice to demonstrate that, with an indexing scheme that adjusts tax brackets with a one-year lag, positive inflation will generally raise average marginal tax rates. Suppose that the tax-rate schedule at time zero is given Similarly, when we refer to capital-income mismeasurement, we will adjust the calculation of income for tax purposes so that the addition of the term ra,-,/(l+w) ) does not cause individuals to be pushed into higher marginal tax-rate brackets solely as a result of higher inflation.
The balance of this paper is devoted to an assessment of the cost, in economic terms, of incomplete indexation given the current structure of the personal tax code. We address this issue specifically by way of simulation exercises with a simple general-equilibrium model of the economy. Before presenting the results of our model simulations, it will be useful to describe briefly the nature of our model. Readers interested only in the results of our simulations can skip the next section without much loss of continuity.
IV. A General-Equilibrium Model of the Economy
Our analysis uses the overlapping-generations framework of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) (AK). We will only briefly describe its structure here. More detailed discussions of the model can be found in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) or Altig and where a variable x,,, refers to the value of x for an individual age s at time t, f, is the after-tax return to capital at time t, and w, is the after-tax market wage at time t. The variable r refers to a lump-sum tax. Equation (2) is easily extended to the case of multiple assets by interpreting atas, at-l,s-l, and f, as vectors and by including the appropriate market-clearing conditions.
The variable E, in equation (2) we have assumed that the economy is closed and that government expenditures are zero. Because we wish to isolate the distortionary effects of inflation-induced changes in marginal tax rates, we will always assume that all revenues raised by distortionary taxation are redistributed to the affected individuals via lump-sum transfers. Thus, we assume that net tax revenues are always zero, so that we can dispense with the specification of the government's budget constraint.
An equilibrium in this model will be characterized by sequences of wages and capital returns such that individual labor and consumption choices are consistent with the aggregate conditions in equations (3) through ( 7 ) .
We do not explicitly model a monetary sector. Inflation is 
V. Bracket Creep i n t h e Current Tax Code
The potential for bracket creep effects has, as intended, Our calculations assume that the average taxpayer is one of a family of four, claims slightly more than the standard deduction, and faces the statutory rate schedule for married persons filing jointly. We have also assumed, counterfactually, that the dollar amounts of personal exemption and standard deduction allowances kept pace with annual realizations of the rate of inflation, and that the ratio of taxable to nontaxable income remains unchanged.
We do not suggest that this number reflects the actual change in the average marginal tax rate from 1971 through 1981. We have completely ignored tax avoidance behavior, changes in the distribution of income, and other complications that might have had a significant impact on the average rate actually realized. Furthermore, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 instituted, among other things, increases in the dollar values of rate brackets, thus implementing a degree of ad hoc indexation.
The exact determination of marginal tax rates under TRA86 is complicated by the phase-out of personal exemptions at higher income levels. . For simplicity, we utilize published rates for taxable incomes below $155,320 (Schedule Y-1 in the Instructions for Form 1040, Internal Revenue Service) and assume a marginal tax rate of 28 percent for all income above $155,320. We emphasize some important qualifications to this statement. First, measuring the progressivity of the tax system is a subtle and ambiguous enterprise (see, for example, Kiefer
[I984 ] ) . Second, as we have noted, our calculations ignore changes in some important determinants of the level of taxable income to which specific tax rates apply. Chief among these for TRA86 are increases in standard deductions, personal exemptions, and the earned-income credit.
These provisions are likely to have important effects on the progressivity of the personal tax code for low-income taxpayers (see Pechman [1987] ).
Our suggestion that progressivity was reduced by ERTA and TRA86 should thus be taken in the casual spirit in which it is given. system with a rate structure and indexing provisions similar to the tax code as of 1 9 8 9 ?~ The results of our bracket creep experiments are given in The actual tax-rate structure relevant to our simulations has marginal tax rates that range from 15 to 28 percent. These rates necessarily differ from those realized in the actual economy for two reasons. First, life-cycle variations represent the only income heterogeneity in our model. The distribution of income in the model is therefore substantially compressed relative to the actual economy. Consequently, no agent in the model faces the highest tax rate (33 percent) or the lowest tax rate (0 percent). Second, to facilitate convergence, we have allowed the tax code to be continuous for a small range of incomes along the transition from a 15 percent marginal tax rate to a 28 percent marginal tax rate.
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Recall that we isolate the effects of bracket creep only by first indexing for capital-income measurement in the simulation exercises.
As noted above, this is accomplished by defining nominal income as Y*=w~*+ [ I -a) as.l.
lo With lagged indexation, steady-state inflation distortions amount to permanently increasing an individual s nominal income, relative to the tax bracket limits, by l+a. hence the larger output costs associated with revenue generation via the interaction of inflation and the nominal tax structure.
V I . What B r a c k e t Indexation C a n ' t F i x : T h e C a s e of C a p i t a l Income
Thus far, we have examined only distortions created by the interaction of progression in the U.S. tax-rate structure and the current practice of adjusting nominal brackets with a one-year lag. These distortions could be eliminated, or at least substantially mitigated, either by making the tax-rate structure less progressive or by reducing the lag between the tax year and index year. Neither of these changes, however, would eliminate the other source of inflation distortion noted above: the failure to index for capital-income adjustment.
Recall that simply deflating by 1 +~ is not sufficient to convert nominal capital income to real capital income--converting income in this way ignores the fact that part of the nominal return to capital is a repayment of principal lost through the effects of inflation. But bracket indexation, even perfect bracket indexation, basically amounts to dividing nominal income by l+s, and so provides no protection to the taxpayer from the mismeasurement of capital income due to inflation. A similar problem, which we have ignored, arises with respect to wage income and Social Security taxes, roughly half of which are imposed on employers. Although Social Security taxes certainly affect the marginal tax-rate structure, we feel that explicitly addressing the Social Security tax issue is of lesser importance than the capital income issues we address in this section. Our justification for this position is threefold. First, labor supply distortions in our model are quantitatively less significant than capital income distortions. Second, the Social Security tax does not involve the tax arbitrage opportunities that are introduced when firms are allowed to choose different capital structures. Third --and this point is related to the second --introducing Social Security taxes is likely to increase the costs associated with bracket creep; on the other hand, as we discuss later, ignoring capital-income-tax arbitrage will yield overestimates of the steady-state losses arising from the interaction of inflation and the tax system. as Y*=(w,*+~ a,-,)/ (l+r) . It is easily verified that defining income in this way overstates capital income by na,-l/(l+n).13
In the second set of simulations, we also abstract from bracket creep, but introduce a richer asset structure into the model in order to capture some of the effect of tax arbitrage behavior. Specifically, we allow firms to purchase capital through the sale of two broad types of claims: debt and equity.
Before proceeding to the results of these simulation experiments, we present a short digression on this extension of our framework.
VII. Debt and Equity in the General-Equilibrium Model
Our expanded framework essentially follows Miller (1977) .
We ignore issues of risk, agency relationships, and so on, and assume that these asset types are distinguished only by tax treatment. Equity finance is subject to two separate tax rates: a flat corporate tax rate, r f , levied at the firm level, and a capital gains tax levied at the individual level. Determination l3 A technical adjustment in the choice of tax bracket limits is necessary to isolate the effects of not indexing for capital income in our cross-steady-state simulation exercises. To motivate the nature of the adjustment, consider an individual whose taxable capital income is incorrectly adjusted for inflation according to the formula Yt=ia -,/(l+a), which we know overstates capital income by an amount equal to the lost value of principal due to inflation. Now consider an alternative economy with a steady-state inflation rate equal-to n. Taxable capital income in this economy is Yt=a,:,/(l+a). It is easily seen that, with static tax brackets, the marglnal tax rate applied to Y' and ?' will not generally be the same. This type of distortion is distinct from the distortion created by nonindexation of capital income that we wish to capture. To avoid this problem, we adjust the tax bracket limits in each of our simulations so that the only distortions are those that arise from not subtracting the term na,-l/(l+a) in the calculation of real taxable income. of the capital gains rate is, of course, significantly complicated by the fact that capital gains are taxed only upon realization. The effective marginal tax rate on capital gains depends on the statutory rate, the inflation rate, and the holding period of the equity instrument. We simplify by assuming that, in the absence of inflation distortions, capital gains are taxed at a flat rate rg.
With respect to debt finance, we allow firms to expense nominal interest payments fully. These interest payments are then taxed at the individual level according to the personalincome tax-rate structure.
Ignoring indexation for the moment, this extension of our simulation model yields the equilibrium conditions where i E is the nominal rate of return to equity, id is the nominal rate of return to debt, and rP* is the marginal tax rate of an individual who is indifferent between holding debt and holding equity. The tax rate rp* can be determined by noting that equations (8) and (9) yield the relationship (1-rP*)= (1-79) (1-rf) .
Individuals who face marginal tax rates below rP* will choose to hold debt; those who face marginal tax rates exceeding rP* will choose to hold equity. Inflation distortions that alter effective marginal tax rates will, therefore, typically induce some individuals to shift between debt and equity.
VIII. Nonindexation of Capital Income: Simulation Results
The significance of capital-income mismeasurement, and the mitigating effect of tax arbitrage behavior on distortions created by the interaction of inflation and tax rates, is apparent from the results of the simulation experiments depicted in figure 4. These experiments assume the benchmark parameter specification, and include the case where the personal tax-rate schedule is applied to homogeneous capital income, the case where both debt and equity income are mismeasured for tax purposes (but taxed at different rates), and the case where equity, but not debt, income is indexed for inflation. In each of these experiments we abstract entirely from bracket creep effects.
The latter two sets of simulations incorporate our extended capital structure, and hence admit some scope for tax arbitrage.
In these simulations, we assume a capital gains tax rate of 18 percent and a corporate tax rate of 10 percent. The 18-percent rate for capital gains assumes a real pre-tax interest rate of 6 percent, a statutory personal tax rate of 28 percent, and an average holding period of 20 years. 14 A corporate tax rate of 10 percent is almost certainly too l 4 The capital gains rate is derived from the formula (l+r (1-rg) ) *=('l+r) *-r ( (l+r) T-l) , where T= the average holding period. low. j5 However, combining a higher corporate tax rate with our assumptions about personal marginal tax rates would quickly yield values of rP* SO high that no individual would choose to hold equity. Since we are primarily interested in the personal tax code, we have chosen to maintain our assumptions about the personal tax parameters, which we believe to be reasonable, and compromise on the corporate tax rate.l6
As seen in figure 4 , the steady-state output losses caused by inflation when there is no indexation for capital-income measurement are uniformly higher in the absence of tax arbitrage opportunities. This result is hardly surprising. However, even when we admit tax arbitrage opportunities, the steady-state output losses are much larger than the losses that arise from pure bracket creep under the current indexing regime. With a steady-state inflation rate equal to 4 percent and constant equity tax rates, annual output without indexation for capitalincome measurement is slightly more than 2 percent lower than annual output in a zero-inflation economy for the benchmark parameterization. Thus, with 1989 as the reference point, the l5 Estimates kindly provided to us by Jane Gravelle suggest that the average effective corporate tax rate is in the range of 30 to 40 percent. Furthermore, our inability to sustain the analysis with realistic corporate tax rates is almost certainly a result of the extremely simple problem with which we have confronted the firm. It is unclear to what extent introducing a more sophisticated capital structure problem would alter our conclusions. We believe that the missing elements have to do with omitted costs to debt finance that would alter the arbitrage condition in equation (8).
To the extent that these costs are invariant to the rate of inflation, our analysis is probably robust to these omissions.
annual real output cost of failure to index for capital-income measurement is about $87 billion ($348 annually in per capita terms, $4.5 trillion in present value terms). This figure is 50 percent greater than the output cost associated with a failure to fully index the tax-rate schedule for bracket creep.
For a given tax structure and inflation rate, the larger output losses arising from capital-income mismeasurement relative to bracket creep do not correspond to larger revenues. In figure   5 we separately plot the simulated increases in steady-state revenues collected from capital-income mismeasurement and bracket creep for the benchmark parameterizations with r g = . 1 8 and r f = . l .
Although revenues increase steadily with inflation in the bracket creep scenario, the revenues raised from the capital-income mismeasurement peak at ~= . 0 5 and decrease thereafter.
This "Laffer curvew associated with capital-income mismeasurement in our extended model clearly illustrates the potentially powerful effects of tax arbitrage. The pattern of revenue shown in figure 5 results from the effect of falling incomes on marginal tax rates, and induced shifts from equity to debt. As firms exploit the write-off provisions of nominal debt payments, corporate tax payments fall, more than offsetting the relative increases in personal tax payments at higher rates of inflation.
In the bracket creep case, income does not decline enough to offset the higher marginal tax rates induced by bracket creep.
Although arbitrage occurs, the net movement is from debt to equity, and so both corporate and personal taxes increase in our simulations for inflation rates up to 10 percent.
The relative inefficiency of raising revenues through the capital-income mismeasurement phenomenon is also apparent when we consider the output losses relative to equal revenue changes in the marginal tax-rate structure plotted in figure The Fisher effect will hold under a progressive tax system with perfect capital-gains indexation if borrowers and lenders face the same marginal tax rate. Under the same conditions, the tax-adjusted Fisher equation would be valid were we to introduce a consumptionloans market.
in which indexation for capital-income measurement is applied to equity income, but not to debt income. At a 4 percent inflation rate, steady-state output in this situation is only -16 percent less than in the zero-inflation economy. Even at a 10 percent rate of inflation, steady-state output is only about .3 percent lower than annual output in the zero-inflation economy. Figure 6 illustrates another interesting aspect of the case in which income from equity, but not debt, is indexed. Revenue generation through capital-income mismeasurement with capital gains indexation is slightly more efficient than equal revenue generation through proportionate increases in statutory marginal tax rates.
As is apparent in figure 7 , the relative efficiency of inflation-generated revenues is dependent, at least when capital gains are indexed, on the preference structure and the level of the inflation rate. Still, it is not surprising that our model includes some set of circumstances under which the output losses from nonequity capital-income mismeasurement are lower than those associated with across-the-board rate increases. The intuitive explanation is essentially the converse of the intuition for the inefficiency of raising revenues through inflation/tax-system interactions we have found in the simulations reported above.
It is clear from the equilibrium conditions (8) and (9) that equity will be held by those individuals who face the highest marginal tax rates. Given the structure of our model, these are precisely the individuals who are the largest savers in the The most obvious message of table 3 is that the full distortion is much greater than the sum of its parts. For a 4 percent steady-state rate of inflation, incomplete bracket indexation and the failure to index for capital-income mismeasurement result in a distortionary annual output loss of $117 billion relative to the loss from increasing marginal tax rates directly in our extended model with tax arbitrage possibilities. The corresponding cost with 10 percent inflation is more than $260 billion (and more than $338 billion in the model without tax arbitrage opportunities).
X. Concluding Remarks
Our analysis has important policy implications, the primary one being that the job of insulating the personal tax code from the distortionary effects of inflation is far from complete.
Given the substantial costs that are likely to result from these distortions, we believe the cases for further tax reform or, failing that, for monetary policies that pursue the goal of price stability, are persuasive. However, we anticipate some possible objections to this conclusion. Our most conservative estimate of the full effects of inflation/tax-system distortions suggests a present-value cost of more than $6 trillion with 4 percent inflation, even when measured relative to the output losses from an equal revenue increase in the statutory tax-rate schedule. Does any sensible analysis predict that the recessionary effects of tight monetary policy would cause a present-value loss of this magnitude?
Critics may argue that the numbers we derive from our simulations are generated from a highly simplified framework. We concede the point, but certainly do not believe that our analysis is any less realistic than analyses that predict substantial costs from monetary policies designed to arrive at zero inflation. At the very least, our estimates have the virtue of being generated from a general-equilibrium framework that is fully identified and not subject to the sample selection biases that contaminate many purely econometric estimates.
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